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An Evolutionary Perspective on Psychiatry 
Randolph M. Nesse 
Recent progress in the evolutionary understanding of behavior may greatly assist psychiatry. 
Although explanations of psychopathology have traditionally emphasized proximate causes of 
individual differences, consideration of the evolutionary functions of human behavior is essential 
for psychiatry, just as biology, ethology, and medicine routinely consider both proximate and 
evoluGonary explanations for a variety of phenomena. The methods and data for testing evolu- 
tionary hypotheses are reviewed, and the ways in which evoluGonary principles can help to explain 
maladaptive behaviors are considered. Some psychiatric symptoms that seem maladaptive may, 
in fact, serve specific survival functions. Hypotheses are proposed about the possible evoluGonary 
significance of overeating, anorexia nervosa, panic attacks, and sexual disorders, and tests of 
these hypotheses are considered. By incorporating an evolutionary perspective on psychopath- 
ology, psychiatry may share the foundation that evolution provides for the rest of natural science. 
I N THE PAST ten years, evolutionary theory has gained substantial new power to explain behaviors and social structures.’ Unanswered problems from Darwin’s 
time have finally been solved, and a whole class of new hypotheses is being generated 
and tested. Milestones for this progress include Hamilton’s 1968 formulation of 
the principle of inclusive fitness, and the 1975 publication of Wilson’s Sociobiol- 
ogy.z-3 The exponential growth since 1975 of publications in this area, attests to 
the impact of these new ideas. The evolutionary study of behaviors and social 
structures is quickly becoming an independent discipline. This new power of ev- 
olutionary theory to explain human behavior has not been widely appreciated or 
utilized by psychiatry. Yet, the application of evolutionary principles to psychiatric 
phenomena makes new questions possible and provides a framework for integrating 
the seemingly diverse levels of the biopsychosocial model. The territory of evolu- 
tionary psychobiology is large, so this presentation must be limited to an outline 
of the logic of evolutionary explanations in psychiatry, and some examples that 
illustrate the benefits and problems of testing evolutionary hypotheses about specific 
psychiatric conditions. 
For every biological phenomenon, two different kinds of causes must be under- 
stood. Proximate (immediate) causes are those that explain a structure or event in 
an individual organism. Ultimate (evolutionary) causes are those that explain the 
existence of a structure or capacity in all members of a species.4 Why does the 
firefly glow? The proximate causes are the environmental precipitants, and the 
sensory, neural, and chemical mechanisms that result in the flash of light. The 
question of ultimate cause may be answered only by explaining the evolutionary 
function of the capacity to glow, and the way that this capacity has increased 
survival or reproduction in the face of specific forces of natural selection.5 
Psychiatry has been preoccupied with proximate explanations, and only rarely 
has considered ultimate explanations .69 “Why do people experience anxiety?’ The 
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question is usually answered in terms of the proximate precipitants and mechanisms, 
physiological and psychological. But we must also understand why the capacity 
for anxiety evolved in humans. Why do essentially all humans experience jealousy, 
grief, and loneliness? Both the ultimate and the proximate causes need to be 
understood for every evolved human capacity. 
In biology, ethology, and medicine, evolutionary explanations are not only ac- 
cepted, they are mandatory. Biologists, too, were once wary of evolutionary ex- 
planations. Ultimate causes are now sought even in physiology and molecular 
biology, where homologous hormones and DNA sequences in vastly different 
species require evolutionary explanation. i” Ernst Mayr, in The Growth of Biological 
Thought, goes so far as to define two biologies: the study of proximate causes is 
one, the study of ultimate causes is the other.4 He emphasizes the legitimacy and 
importance of both. In Ethology, Hinde states four necessary kinds of questions 
about the behavior: (1) What is the immediate cause of the behavior? (2) What is 
the ontogenetic history of the behavior? (3) What is the evolutionary function of 
the behavior? (4) What is the phylogenetic history of the behavior?” Answers to 
all four questions are essential to fully explain any behavior, animal or human. 
In medicine, considerations of evolutionary function are so taken for granted 
that they can be hard to recognize. The circulatory system, the immune system, 
and the digestive system are each defined by their evolved function. The internist 
recognizes syndromes by the typical pathophysiology which results when the func- 
tion of a specific system is disrupted. Treatment may be possible on this basis, 
even if the etiology is unknown. Psychiatry, because it does not recognize the 
analogous behavioral adaptive systems, is forced to search for either specific etiology 
or empirical treatment. 
The problems encountered in testing hypotheses about the evolutionary function 
of human traits are real but surmountable. This issue is most comprehensively 
assessed by Alexander in Darwinism and Human Affairs.12 The principle that every 
capacity in every species has an evolutionary function, has some limits. Also, there 
is no direct fossil record of behavior, and the human species is a special case. But 
the basic principles of evolution apply equally well to behavioral and emotional 
capacities in all species. i3 The benefits and problems of evolutionary explanations 
are best considered using specific examples, but some general issues must ‘first be 
reviewed. 
The logical pattern for an evolutionary analysis of a psychiatric phenomenon is 
essentially the same as the pattern for’analysis of any behavior: , 
1. Define the phenomenon to be explained. 
2. Explicate the proximal causes (environmental, psychological, and neurochemical). 
3. Hypothesize possible ‘ultimate causes. 
4. Drive predictions from these hypotheses. 
5. Test the predictions against the data. 
6. If the phenomenon is not an adaptation, but is thought to represent pathology, 
then find the level, nature, and etiology of the defect in the functional adaptive 
system affected. 
Definition of the phenomenon and explication of the’proximate causal chain is 
the usual pattern of explanations in psychiatry. Environmental precipitant& neu- 
rochemical, learning, psychodynamic, and social factors are all important. From 
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consideration of these factors, especially the interactions between the environmental 
situation and the behavior, some clues usually emerge about the evolutionary 
function of the phenomenon, and a hypothesis may be proposed. Testing hypotheses 
about evolutionary functions of behavior is essentially the same as for other traits 
and structures. Evidence of three kinds can be brought to bear: (1) contextual 
observations, (2) comparative method, and (3) experiment. 
Contextual observation is the method of ethology. 10*14 This discipline has so far 
contributed most of the evolutionary perspective available on psychiatry.‘5-‘8 Evi- 
dence is provided by environmental and internal states that elicit the behavior, by 
the details of the behavior itself, and by the effects which result from the behavior. 
If correct, the hypothesis should be consistent with this evidence, and should predict 
additional details and correlates. For behavior, the comparative method cannot 
rely on fossil evidence, but differences between similar behavior patterns in related 
species should be predicted by the specific ecological adaptations made by each 
species. 
The experimental method can provide evidence when a capacity is disrupted and 
observations are made of the extent and reason for subsequent decreased fitness. 
Genetic, surgical, and drug effects can be used, but it is always hard to be sure 
that the intervention has not accidentally confounded other variables. The first 
stage of hypothesis testing often involves naturalistic observations which predict 
the adaptive consequences of depriving an organism of a capacity. 
The issue of pathology must be confronted before specific examples are consid- 
ered. Well and good, one might say, that evolution can provide explanations of 
normal behavior. But abnormal behavior, by definition, has no adaptive function. 
How can an evolutionary perspective help us to explain psychopathology? First, 
it defines normality according to the adaptive consequences of a behavior pattern, 
without reference to the usual criteria of “freedom from distress,” “interference 
with functioning,” or “statistical abnormality.” Second, many symptoms can be 
recognized as distressing, but adaptive. Pain is unpleasant, almost by definition. 
Yet the early death of people who lack the capacity for pain, makes the adaptive 
function of this system clear. I9 Nausea and vomiting are equally aversive, but 
individuals who did not have these capacities, must often have died of poisoning 
and infection. Cough is another protective reflex. The very fact that these experiences 
are so unpleasant may be a result of evolution. These symptoms are often elicited 
by a threat to homeostasis, yet they are not in themselves pathological, but are 
normal evolved defenses against pathology. Is anxiety another example? Though 
unpleasant, it seems to be a universal capacity that is reliably elicited by very 
specific situations. This suggests that it, too, may be an evolved capacity with an 
adaptive function. Other human emotional capacities meet the same criteria: 
loneliness, guilt, grief, jealousy, fatigue, and boredom. 
Finally, there are phenomena that are not universal capacities and those that are 
maladaptive even from an evolutionary perspective. One approach has been to 
ignore this distinction and insist that there is a function for everything. But, to 
blithely assume adaptive functions for schizophrenia, endogenous depression, sui- 
cide, and child abuse, makes a mockery of the evolutionary perspective. Proposed 
functions must be justified in terms of their impact on genetic fitness. Just because 
we all have the capacity for psychosis, does not make it adaptive. We all have the 
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capacity for a positive Babinski sign, but this is a release phenomenon, not an 
evolutionary adaptation. For a pathological symptom or syndrome it is necessary 
to: (1) Identify the adaptive system involved; (2) Explicate the proximate mechanism 
that normally operates the system; (3) Identify the locus, nature, and etiology of 
the specific defect in that system; and (4) Assess the effect of that defect on the 
adaptive function of the system. In particular, disruptions of a control system need 
to be distinguished from more fundamental disruptions of the capacity itself. In 
most mental illness, normal human emotions and behavior patterns are elicited too 
early or late, too intensely or mildly, or in response to the wrong stimulus. In 
others, the capacity is absent, or the response is fundamentally deformed. 
It may be helpful to emphasize what is not being argued. It is not proposed that 
genetic differences explain an individual’s behavior. And it is not proposed that all 
behavior is innate. The capacity for individual learning is present in so many species 
precisely because it affords such a substantial selective advantage. The thesis is, 
instead, that almost every behavior and emotional capacity and tendency shared 
by all humans, is a result of evolution, and therefore serves an adaptive function 
that increases the survival and reproduction of that individual’s genes. 
Eating disorders are among the most common, most treated, and most studied 
of psychiatric problems, yet the adaptive functions of eating and satiety, and the 
evolution of the responsible mechanisms, are rarely considered. What selective 
pressures shaped the mechanism that controls the quantity of food consumed? 
There are two motivating forces, hunger and satiety, each with specific evolved 
anatomic localization and neurohumoral control. For hunger, the selective forces 
are clear. An organism that does not eat, quickly dies, and its genes are eliminated 
from the pool. Furthermore, periods of limited food supply have selected for the 
capacity to store fat, and the behavioral tendency to eat enough to fill these stores 
when necessary. Pregnancy is one condition in which additional fat stores are 
particularly adaptive. Females with the capacity and tendency to store additional 
fat during pregnancy, are able to nurse their infants through a famine; the infants 
of mothers who do not gain weight often die. The clinical observation that obesity 
often begins with pregnancy or the administration of birth control pills supports 
this hypothesis. Detailed analysis of the responsible mechanism should be possible. 
But how could the satiety mechanism augment survival? Large individuals needs 
more food to sustain themselves, and will therefore provide less for their mates 
and offspring. They will also be slower and therefore less effective as hunters and 
more vulnerable as prey. 
Why are there more overweight than underweight people in the industrial SO- 
cieties? Proximate explanations look at the food types and availability, and at 
energy expenditure, but the ultimate explanation is that some natural selection 
forces have shaped a hunger system that absolutely ensures adequate food intake, 
while other selection forces have shaped a satiety mechanism that is feeble by 
comparison. 
Anorexia nervosa is more clearly pathological, yet the remarkable consistency 
of this syndrome suggests the presence of a possible adaptive mechanism. Patients 
usually describe a period of strict dieting, followed by an overwhelming fear of 
obesity that is associated with preoccupation with food, and fear of gorging or 
actual episodes of bulimia. ** A speculative hypothesis emerges. Does there exist a 
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mechanism, evolved after millions of years of feast and famine, that prepares 
individuals for periods of food shortage, by inducing eating behavior to store 
calories? Diet-induced hypoglycemia could elicit this behavior pattern and result 
in impulses to gorge. Women with a socially induced fear of obesity and a strong 
ability to resist impulses, might try to control their weight by more strict dieting, 
thus setting up a positive feedback cycle that would make things still worse. This 
has obvious implications for obesity. Can dieting cause obesity? Perhaps. This 
hypothesis gives rise to the nonobvious testable prediction that, in many species, 
individuals exposed to periods of food deprivation should gain more weight than 
otherwise identical individuals given continuous access to food. The hypothesis 
seems less farfetched when one considers the many species that respond to envi- 
ronmental cues anticipating the hibernation season by gaining large amounts of 
weight. 
Panic disorder is another very consistent syndrome. 21 Patients with panic disorder 
report attacks coming “out of the blue,” that begin with overwhelming terror and 
perhaps a moment of immobility. In seconds, patients experience palpitations, 
shortness of breath, sweating, an empty feeling in the stomach, and a wish to run 
home to be with trusted relatives. Repeated attacks lead to agoraphobia, as patients 
avoid locations where panic attacks have occurred. Agoraphobics also typically 
avoid certain other situations, including wide open spaces, being alone, being far 
from home, and being in any situation in which they might be, or feel, trapped. 
Cannon’s “fight or flight” response is an almost perfect description of the signs 
and symptoms of a panic attack. 22 The rapid heart rate, pale skin as blood is 
shunted to muscle, the cooling sweat, the hyperventilation to oxygenate the blood- 
all are adaptive preparations for fight or flight. But fight with or flight from what? 
From predators and hostile humans. Not only are the characteristics of the reflex 
consistent with this, but the environmental precipitants are too. Of course the 
organism is made apprehensive by wide open spaces without trees, and by locations 
in which it may be trapped, so are most prey animals. The momentary immobility 
at the onset of danger is a camouflage device used by mice and rabbits as well as 
primates. Why flee home and seek out trusted relatives? Every social animal does 
the same. Why are women more susceptible? Probably because they are usually 
more vulnerable. Why should severe apprehension result from one-time learning? 
Individuals who had no fear when they saw a lion for the second time on the open 
plain did not survive. 
As psychophysiological capacities intimately related to reproduction, sexual re- 
sponses are particularly susceptible to evolutionary analysis. Every book on sexual 
disorders contains extensive discussion about the causes and treatment of premature 
ejaculation in men and delayed orgasm in women. By why do men usually reach 
orgasm more rapidly than women? Well, what if it were reversed? A woman who 
consistently reached orgasm quickly and stopped coitus before her mate reached 
orgasm would rarely reproduce. A man whose orgasm was consistently delayed 
would also be at a reproductive disadvantage. Genes that cause such tendencies 
are quickly eliminated. Natural selection did not shape us for harmony and pleasure, 
but, inevitably, for effective reproduction. That anxiety causes impotence is common 
knowledge. The reason may be that copulating couples who continued when danger 
appeared, had even shorter lives than their contemporaries. 
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These examples are few and incomplete. The specific predictions that offer tests 
for each hypothesis deserve more detailed discussion, and additional examples could 
consider the evolutionary significance of other psychiatric symptoms, the emotions, 
the personality types, and the mental structures. But here the goal must be simply 
to demonstrate the legitimacy and importance of seeking ultimate explanations and 
the ability of evolutionary theory to help us find these explanations. At this point, 
evolutionary psychobiology offers many new questions and few firm answers. But 
by recognizing the evolutionary origins of human nature, and by considering the 
adaptive significance of every human capacity, psychiatry may gradually come to 
share the firm foundation that evolution provides for all of natural science. 
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